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Urban Guerrilla Warfare$
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Anthony James Joes

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780813124377

Published to Kentucky Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124377.001.0001

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Grozny 1994–1996

Grozny 1994–1996

Chapter:
(p.131) 7 Grozny 1994–1996
Source:
Urban Guerrilla Warfare
Author(s):

Anthony James Joes

Publisher:
University Press of Kentucky
DOI:10.5810/kentucky/9780813124377.003.0008

Emboldened by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chechen parliament declared its full independence in November 1991. However, the Russian government headed by President Boris Yeltsin refused to recognize this and ordered the deployment of troops to Chechnya. A full-scale invasion was launched in Grozny at the end of 1994, following Dzhokhar Dudayev's refusal to sign any treaty of union with Russia. Although vastly outnumbering the Chechen forces, the Russian army was not adequately trained in urban warfare and counterinsurgency. Its poor intelligence and reconnaissance failures also led them to underestimate the Chechens' resolve, dismissing them as merely a collection of clans. In the spring of 1996, Chechen forces launched a series of offensives that would recapture Grozny from Russian control. By August, the Russians negotiated for a cease-fire and agreed to have Grozny temporarily under dual control until January 1997, when the last Russian military units left Chechnya.

Keywords:   Chechnya, Grozny, Russian invasion, urban guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency, military intelligence

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