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No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949. Tracing the blockade’s origins, it explains why British and American planners during the Second World War neglected Western access to postwar Berlin and why Western officials did little to reduce Berlin’s vulnerability as Cold War tensions increased. Standard accounts mistakenly emphasize an early decision to rely on an airlift to defeat the blockade. Leaders did not sit down, weigh alternatives, and choose “airlift” as the course of action that would resolve the crisis on their terms. No one at first believed the airlift could defeat the blockade; its inevitable failure would confront the Western powers with a choice between withdrawing from Berlin and starting a war. The airlift’s unexpected success transformed the crisis, confronting the Soviets with the choice between war and retreat. The Western powers found it harder to concert policy during the crisis than standard accounts acknowledge. The study traces diplomatic negotiations at all levels, from Berlin to the United Nations, examines the crisis’s effects on the 1948 US presidential election, and traces how the blockade affected US debates over the custody and use of atomic weapons.

The 1914 Christmas truce, when enemy soldiers met, fraternized, and even played football in No Man’s Land during the first year of the First World War, is commonly perceived as a manifestation of the anger that soldiers felt toward the meaningless war that they had been tricked into fighting. Contemporaneous sources, however, show that the truce was not an act of defiance; rather, it arose from the professionalism of the soldiers involved, the conditions of static trench warfare, foul weather on the Western Front, the absence of major battles, and memories of traditional celebrations of Christmas. The truce, in short, was caused by rain, mud, curiosity, lack of personal animosity toward the enemy, and homesickness, rather than by frustration and rebellion. No soldiers were punished for their participation in the 1914 truce, and no troops refused to fire on their enemies afterward. Newspapers published accounts of the armistice openly, and many regimental histories later featured the event prominently. An examination of references to the truce over the past century reveals the myths that have defined it and contrasts those myths with the words and actions of participants in the armistice. By examining the support the soldiers felt for the war, as well as their willingness to return to fighting after Christmas 1914 ended, the book argues that the Christmas truce, which would seem to confirm the dominant view of the First World War, instead challenges the war’s popular narrative.

Throughout the 1920s, German politician and activist Ernst Thälmann was the leader of the largest Communist Party organization outside the Soviet Union. Thälmann was the most prominent left-wing politician in the country's 1932 election and ran third in the presidential race after Hitler and von Hindenberg. After the Nazi Party's victory in that contest, Thälmann was imprisoned and held in solitary confinement for eleven years before being executed at Buchenwald concentration camp in 1944 at the Führer's direct orders. Hitler's Rival examines how the Communist Party gradually transformed Thälmann into a fallen mythic hero, building a cult that became one of their most important propaganda tools in central Europe. Author Russel Lemmons analyzes the party intelligentsia's methods, demonstrating how they used various media to manipulate public memory and exploring the surprising ways in which they incorporated Christian themes into their messages. Examining the facts as well as the propaganda, this volume separates the intriguing true biography of the cult figure from the fantastic myth that was created around him.