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This work examines the relationships that developed between the domestic U.S. press and the Central Intelligence Agency, from the foundation of the agency in 1947 to the first major congressional investigation of the U.S. intelligence system in 1975–1976. The press environment in which the CIA developed had important consequences for the types of activities the agency undertook, and after some initial difficulties the CIA enjoyed a highly favorable press environment in its early years. The CIA did, on occasion, attempt to use reporters operationally and spread propaganda around the world. This work argues, however, that a more important factor in the generally positive press environment that the early CIA enjoyed was the social relationships that developed between members of the press, especially management, and members of the agency. Common ties of elite education, wartime service, and a shared view of the danger of communism allowed the agency both to conduct a variety of activities without exposure in the United States, and to protect itself from oversight and establish its place in the U.S. national security bureaucracy. Even during the height of cooperative ties, however, there were those in the press critical of the CIA and others who, even if cooperating, were wary of agency activities. Over time, these countertrends increased as the Cold War consensus frayed, and press attention led to sustained investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the infamous Year of Intelligence, 1975–1976.

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism provided a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned, policy makers made military support the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response, the CIA and DoD instituted changes that altered their relationship. While congressional debates over the Intelligence Community’s future were occurring, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship during operations. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening long-term analysis. Despite concerns, no major changes to intelligence organization or priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers fixated on terrorism. The DoD/CIA operational relationship has led to successes, but the CIA’s counterterrorism and military support requirements place a significant burden on the organization. As the sole independent US intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate intelligence collection from the institutions that develop and execute policy. Its increased focus on support to military operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones affected by this evolving relationship, but policy makers’ preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy has led both organizations down this path.