This book discusses the formulation and execution of US foreign policy in Laos during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Based on documents from the US National Archives, the Kennedy Library, the Library of Congress, and other public and private collections of primary sources, the book provides an intimate look at the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the 1962 Geneva accords. It also examines the rapid breakdown of that agreement, the response of the Kennedy administration to the collapse of the Geneva solution, and the consequences of that response not only ... More

This book discusses the formulation and execution of US foreign policy in Laos during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Based on documents from the US National Archives, the Kennedy Library, the Library of Congress, and other public and private collections of primary sources, the book provides an intimate look at the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the 1962 Geneva accords. It also examines the rapid breakdown of that agreement, the response of the Kennedy administration to the collapse of the Geneva solution, and the consequences of that response not only for Laos but also for Vietnam. Kennedy's most far-reaching response to the failure of the Geneva agreement was settling for a de facto partition of Laos, with a center-right coalition controlling the population and agricultural centers of the Mekong River Valley and the communist-led Pathet Lao dominating the mountainous jungle region bordering Vietnam. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma remained in nominal charge of an ostensibly integrated government, and fighting between the center-right coalition and the Pathet Lao was “secret”—at least to the extent that neither the United States nor the DRV publicly admitted its own role in the conflict. This fragile equilibrium established a pattern of combat in Laos that grew in intensity during the Johnson and Nixon administrations.