The escalation of the War of Attrition led to the construction of Bar-Lev Line. Depth bombing forced Egypt to build up a dense antiaircraft layout. “The regulars will hold!” concept, even in the event of a two-front surprise attack, was based on warning, deterrence, and Israeli Air Force (IAF) power, but the coming confrontation had not been defined, and no plans had been devised for Sinai's defense. During the ceasefire the Bar-Lev Line atrophied, the quality of troops declined, and errors were rife at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The defensive battle was characterized by ... More

The escalation of the War of Attrition led to the construction of Bar-Lev Line. Depth bombing forced Egypt to build up a dense antiaircraft layout. “The regulars will hold!” concept, even in the event of a two-front surprise attack, was based on warning, deterrence, and Israeli Air Force (IAF) power, but the coming confrontation had not been defined, and no plans had been devised for Sinai's defense. During the ceasefire the Bar-Lev Line atrophied, the quality of troops declined, and errors were rife at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The defensive battle was characterized by blunders in the application of force: the Dovecote and Scratch plans were not executed, tanks operated as they had in the War of Attrition, and the strongholds were not evacuated. The October 9 counterattack failed because of errors in the battle procedure and force application, Gonen's obsession with crossing the canal, and Elazar's irresponsible approval of plans. The IAF's priorities—defending the country's skies, attaining air superiority, and supporting the ground forces—stayed the same, even when events demanded a recalibration. The IAF's success in neutralizing the enemy's missiles was minimal, and close air support was negligible. The necessity of a preemptive strike waned after 1967. Fearing a clash with the United States, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan vetoed a preemptive strike. (Israel was not “awarded a medal for good behavior.”) A preemptive or parallel air strike on Egypt's bridging equipment could have disrupted its offensive and enabled a battlefield decision on the eastern bank of the canal within four or five days.