This book analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean War. Several themes are addressed. One is how Truman and the congressional Democrats failed each other during the war. The president did not dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term and was slow to react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically. For their part, the Democrats gave Truman poor advice concerning congressional involvement in the decision to take the nation to war. A number of them a ... More

This book analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean War. Several themes are addressed. One is how Truman and the congressional Democrats failed each other during the war. The president did not dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term and was slow to react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically. For their part, the Democrats gave Truman poor advice concerning congressional involvement in the decision to take the nation to war. A number of them allowed their personal dislike for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to poison their support for the administration whenever U.S. fortunes in the war soured. Another issue was Truman’s interpretation and use of the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy and his manipulation of the idea for political advantage. Ironically, had he listened to the counsel of an administration Republican early in the war, Truman could have mitigated the explosion over the firing of General Douglas MacArthur. A topic heretofore overlooked by historians concerns congressional peace initiatives proposed during the first half of the war. Analysis of the effectiveness of these resolutions, particularly during the heyday of McCarthyism, yields surprising conclusions.