This book documents the formulation and execution of US foreign policy in Cambodia during the Eisenhower administration. Based on exhaustive research at the US National Archives, the Eisenhower Library, and other public and private collections of primary sources, the book is a detailed narrative of the Eisenhower administration’s diplomatic struggle with Norodom Sihanouk. A difficult leader who was, at least initially, pro-Western in his political orientation, Sihanouk offended top US officials with his “neutralism.” For much of Eisenhower’s presidency, national security policy supported those ... More

This book documents the formulation and execution of US foreign policy in Cambodia during the Eisenhower administration. Based on exhaustive research at the US National Archives, the Eisenhower Library, and other public and private collections of primary sources, the book is a detailed narrative of the Eisenhower administration’s diplomatic struggle with Norodom Sihanouk. A difficult leader who was, at least initially, pro-Western in his political orientation, Sihanouk offended top US officials with his “neutralism.” For much of Eisenhower’s presidency, national security policy supported those who worked against Sihanouk. The book pays particular attention to US relations with anticommunist Cambodian dissidents, especially Dap Chhuon and Son Ngoc Thanh, and with their patrons in South Vietnam and Thailand. This book argues that covert intervention in the internal political affairs of neutral Cambodia proved to be a counterproductive tactic for advancing US anticommunist goals. A contribution to a still-emerging understanding of covert operations in the cold war, the book contends that the US experience in Cambodia in the 1950s deserves more attention in histories of the Indochinese wars and in assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president. Although some historians have documented President Eisenhower’s moderation, prudence, and restraint in managing the nation’s foreign affairs, these qualities were often lacking in his administration’s relations with Cambodia, which were largely defined by hostility to Sihanouk’s conception of neutrality, by contempt for the prince personally, and by a covert effort to encourage his overthrow.