This book highlights a seminal but largely overlooked period in the development of American counterinsurgency strategy. It examines how Progressive counterinsurgency ideas and methods evolved between 1899 and 1913 as Americans fought Philippine Moros in their first sustained military encounter with Islamic militants. It then compares those ideas and methods with current theory on COIN (counterinsurgency) as set forth in The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The author also explores how Moros contested American military intervention in their lives. He asks: How did they bend the narrative? How did Progressive counterinsurgency in Mindanao and Sulu come to have a Moro face? Finally, this work focuses on how John J. Pershing, during his seven years of service among Moros, contributed to Progressive counterinsurgency strategy. How did his approach compare with Gen. Leonard Wood’s radically different ideas on pacification? In the most creative years of Pershing’s life, how did he pull together lessons learned from his Philippine experience to craft a relatively balanced and full-spectrum approach to fighting small wars? What can we take from his experience and apply to America’s fraught relationship with Islamic militancy today?